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We document entry and capacity expansion in US long-distance fiber-optic
networks before and during the “telecom boom.” We disentangle the many
swaps and leases between networks in order to measure owned route miles
versus route miles shared with other carriers. Entry appears much more
moderate when these shared miles are not counted. Preemption strategies
can lead to excessive entry, and we find evidence for preemptive behavior
regarding total miles (including swaps and leases) but less for preemption
regarding owned miles. We conclude that entry was excessive only with
regard to swaps and leases, but not with regard to the physical building of
the networks.
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1 Introduction
During the late 1990s there was tremendous capacity expansion and entry
of new firms in the North American long-haul telecommunications industry.
These expansions were driven by very fast demand growth for Internet and
other data-oriented telecom services and by exponential decreases in the
cost per bit transmitted using fiber optic communications equipment. But
by 2001, competition and slowing demand growth were squeezing the profits
of these carriers, and an equally unprecedented slowdown in spending oc-
curred. The problems in the telecommunications sector have been blamed
for dragging down growth in the entire U.S. economy.
As the expansion turned to bust, discussion of “excessive entry” and a
“fiber glut” became increasingly common. Generally the fiber glut story
revolves around three premises. First, Internet growth was not as fast
as expected, and in particular, not as fast as Worldcom claimed (Odlyzko
2003). Second, the still-high growth rate of data traffic was “...not nearly
fast enough to use all of the millions of miles of fiber-optic lines that were
buried beneath streets and oceans in the late-1990s frenzy.”1 Third, the
1Yochi Dreazen, “Behind the Fiber Glut – Telecom Carriers Were Driven By Wildly
Optimistic Data on Internet’s Growth Rate,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26,
2002, pg. B1.
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equipment used to send data over fiber optic cable improved dramatically
so that each strand of fiber could carry many more gigabits of data: “Per-
haps never before has the efficiency of an industry’s technology gotten so
far ahead of demand.”2
These gloomy statements have become the conventional wisdom: there
was excessive entry of fiber optic networks based on overoptimism and strate-
gic behavior. In this paper, we analyze whether this conventional wisdom is
correct based on new data on sunk investments (actual miles of right-of-way)
and non-sunk investments (relatively fungible swaps and leases of conduit
space and fiber). We also run empirical tests for preemptive behavior that
might lead to ex post unprofitable networks. We find that more than half of
the entry was non-sunk investment, and evidence for preemption is largely
limited to these non-sunk investments. We conclude that the “excessive”
label is applicable only to these swaps and leases.
To our knowledge there is no economics literature analyzing this indus-
try’s growth and decline. Indeed, very little data has been collected on
which firms entered when and where. Until 1998, Jonathan Kraushaar of
the Federal Communications Commission published a yearly update on long
2Dennis Berman, “Behind the Fiber Glut – Innovation Outpaced the Marketplace,”
The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2002, pg. B1.
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distance fiber optic networks, but this was discontinued just as industry in-
vestment took off. In this paper we present newly collected data that merges
Kraushaar’s work with publicly available information on firms’ entry deci-
sions up to the end of 2001.
Section 2 discusses the relevant theory of firm entry, investment, and
sunk costs and applies it to the national telecom network industry. We also
compare today’s telecoms crisis to the problems of late nineteenth century
railroads. In section 3, we describe our data sources and methods of data
collection. We analyze the pattern of entry and the decrease in industry
concentration in section 4. In section 5, we test for preemptive behavior.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Sunk Costs and National Fiber-Optic Networks
The building of the national fiber optic networks is another chapter in the
peculiar history of U.S. infrastructure industries. This history started with
the canal boom of the early nineteenth century, reached its most dramatic
episode in the railroad booms and busts of the late nineteenth century, and
has continued since then with electricity transmission, Interstate highways,
and cable television among others. All of these industries have been politi-
cally as well as economically important, and all have been characterized by
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financial instability and/or heavy government regulation.
In particular, the recent telecom boom and bust has been compared to
the nineteenth century railroad experience, and the two do appear similar
in many regards. In both cases, a large number of firms gained access to
rights-of-way between major cities, built multiple parallel routes, and then
engaged in intense competition that left many of them bankrupt. But we
discuss below that the key to this comparison is the nature of sunk costs in
the two industries, and that in fact the two are quite different in this regard.
Entry decisions in high-sunk-cost industries can be represented using a
two-stage game (Sutton 1998). In stage 1, firms make irreversible invest-
ments that determine their characteristics, such as product variety or quality
or some measure of capacity. These investments are industry-specific sunk
costs, so the firms do not exit the market later in the game. In stage 2, the
firms compete according to Cournot, differentiated Bertrand, or some other
type of competition. The terms of this competition are affected by the stage
1 decisions. Sutton suggests that a very loose requirement for a solution to
this game is a criterion of viability. That is, firms will not make stage 1
investments that they cannot recoup as operating profit in stage 2.
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) argue that for infrastructure industries
like telecom networks, the basic game structure can be further refined as
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follows: In stage 1, firms invest in distribution capacity that determines
where they can offer service in geographical space. Then stage 2 can be
divided into two parts. In stage 2a, firms invest in production capacity that
determines how much they can produce in each area that they serve, and
in stage 2b they compete in each area subject to these production capacity
constraints. The key to this interpretation is that distribution capacity
is a sunk cost because investments like rights-of-way, conduits, and utility
poles have no alternative use and are not fungible. But production capacity
is not sunk because investments like locomotives, telephone switches, and
transformers can be resold or redeployed and are therefore fungible.
Under this interpretation, the key to competition between infrastructure
firms is geography, since the sunk distribution capacity means that once a
firm enters a territory it can commit not to leave. Production capacity, on
the other hand, may affect short-run competitive outcomes (for example, it
might lead to Cournot outcomes in the manner of Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983)), but it does not carry long-run commitment value. For example,
entry by a second railroad between two cities would irrevocably increase
the number of competitors to two, but it would not inevitably lead to zero-
profit Bertrand competition since production capacity (e.g. the number of
locomotives) could be adjusted periodically.
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For long-haul fiber optic networks, distribution capacity involves securing
a right of way, burying protective conduits in this right-of-way, building
“huts” to house equipment at intervals along the route, and placing fiber-
optic cable inside the conduit. Each strand of fiber has very large data
capacity, each cable contains many strands of fiber, and many firms own
multiple conduits, so for the foreseeable future no further upgrades to this
distribution capacity are necessary.3
It is prohibitively expensive to acquire new rights-of-way, so the networks
generally follow highways, railroads, and natural gas pipelines. In fact,
several of the major networks are associated with companies that own these
rights-of-way. Williams, for example, is a natural gas pipeline owner, while
Qwest was originally a division of the Southern Pacific Railroad. There is
some irony in the comparison with nineteenth century railroads because in
many cases the same rights of way were used during the fiber boom.
Production capacity consists of terminal equipment that takes electronic
data from many sources, switches and combines it into channels, and con-
verts it to optical signals using lasers. This is called “lighting” the fiber in
the industry jargon. Such equipment is expensive but can be moved, resold,
3There are periodically advances in the quality of fiber-optic strands, so systems in
which it is easier to install new fiber have an advantage in the long run.
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expanded, and contracted given sufficient lead time. There are some sunk
costs involved, so the quantity of lit fiber has some short-run commitment
value. But in the long run, overcapacity and low prices on a particular route
should lead to redeployment of equipment away from that route. For now
the marginal cost of production capacity relative to the size of demand is
very small and appears to be causing very low prices.
Why did numerous firms invest in sunk distribution capacity when there
were signs that operating profits would be low? Part of the answer is that
the number of firms that installed production capacity is much larger than
the number that installed distribution capacity. The reason this was possible
is that owners of rights-of-way were willing to sell indefeasible rights of use
(IRUs) by means of which firms could obtain either space in conduits or
dark fiber (fiber optic cable with no terminal equipment attached at the
ends). These IRUs convey many of the rights of ownership, but they are
typically limited to 20 years, can be dissolved by mutual agreement, and
are frequently abrogated by bankruptcy courts. Furthermore, despite the
careful language of IRU agreements, in an industry with rapidly changing
technology there are likely to be many noncontractables that could render
an IRU economically obsolete earlier than its legal expiration.
The fact that so many fiber-optic networks are based on IRUs means
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that sunk distribution capacity is much less than the number of national
networks would suggest. Firms that go bankrupt and hold IRUs are likely
to exit the industry once and for all. Only those firms that actually hold
right of way are committed to continuing employment of their assets even
in the face of bankruptcy reorganization.
Contrast this situation to the nineteenth century railroad boom. Arthur
Hadley (1885) discussed how the sunk-cost nature of railroad right of way
created perpetual instability in the railroad industry. When competition on
a route (New York to Chicago was particularly competitive) was too great to
support all the lines on the route, some railroads went bankrupt. But their
sunk investment in right of way had no alternative use, so the insolvent line
simply emerged from bankruptcy with its debt reduced, and the number of
competitors remained the same. This pattern, and the companies’ collusive
attempts to combat it, eventually led to regulation of the industry.
3 Data
Our data measure the distribution capacity actually installed and the amount
installed under IRUs and similar agreements. The simplest summary mea-
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sure of distribution capacity is total route-miles of network.4 Since all net-
works in the sample reach all major American cities, higher route miles
indicate more small cities served and/or more redundancy in the network.
In nearly all cases, the promotional and technical materials made available
by telecom firms do not differentiate between route miles owned outright and
those owned through IRUs. Thus we reconstruct the process by which each
network was built, noting which routes are based on IRUs (shared miles)
and which on owned right of way (owned miles). In some cases, routes are
jointly owned, in which case we count one-half the miles for each of two
owners and one-third for each of three. Jointly owned routes are a much
smaller portion of total mileage than are IRUs and do not greatly affect the
totals.
During the period 1986-1998, the FCC collected similar data from the
inter-exchange (long distance) telephone companies. These data were com-
piled and analyzed by Jonathan Kraushaar in what was then the Commis-
sion’s Common Carrier Bureau, and the reports continue to be available
at the FCC’s website. The FCC data collection proceeded through volun-
tary questionnaires and telephone calls, and they received a high response
4Each route mile typically contains many strands of fiber-optic cable, so measures of
“fiber miles” or “strand miles” are usually many times larger than route miles.
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rate. Toward the end of the sample period, they expressed concern that
fiber routes miles were being double-counted, precisely for the reasons we
discussed above. We use the FCC data for nearly all firms that had fiber net-
works during the period 1990-96, with some corrections for shared mileage.
For 1997-98, we use the FCC data primarily as a check against our own
data. From 1999-2001 we must rely on our own data exclusively. We found
that in most cases our data was consistent with the FCC’s.
Our main source for total route miles is the firms’ annual reports and
investment prospectuses as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and available through the online EDGAR database (primarily forms
10-K and S-4). Some companies included very meticulous network data
with these filings, while others simply mentioned route miles in passing.
To supplement that source, we also searched each company’s press re-
leases using the archives on LEXIS/NEXIS. In many cases, firms obtained
IRUs by swapping access to their own right of way for access to the right of
way of their competitors. The firms often announced and promoted these
swaps as an inexpensive way to build their network quickly. In several cases,
firms swapped access to a preexisting IRU for a preexisting IRU on another
firm’s route, so that the swaps could be more than one layer deep. Because
of this, we frequently know that a route is based on an IRU but cannot
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definitely determine the source of that IRU. Fortunately, this problem does
not affect the computation of owned versus shared route miles.
The firms’ reports were checked on a route-by-route basis against net-
work maps available at the companies’ web sites (in most cases) or from
Internet service provider resellers (for Qwest, MCIWorldcom, McLeodUSA,
and ENRON). They were also checked against the map “North American
National and Regional Fiberoptic Long-Haul Routes Planned and In Place”
published by KMI Research and dated May 2002. The inconsistencies were
minor.
Although we are quite confident that the routes identified as shared are
in fact shared, there are probably additional IRUs and swaps that were
not reported. As such, the database is conservative since it attributes all
other miles as owned. We were not able to find as complete data on Sprint
as on other networks. All our sources suggest that Sprint’s network was
largely completed before the sample period and not significantly expanded
thereafter. For years in which no data was available for Sprint, we have
assumed no expansion and entered the previous year’s figure.
The sample is limited to firms that either achieved national reach or had
announced aspirations to national reach. Regional networks (which include
the local telephone companies) are not counted. They actually include the
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majority of fiber in the United States, but they do not compete in the same
national market. Providing national coverage by piecing together circuits
from regional networks is too expensive and unreliable to be competitive.5
We also exclude firms that purchased access to national networks but did
not own any mileage of their own and did not participate in any swaps of
IRUs; these were customers, not peers, of the carriers listed.
4 Entry and Investment
We now document the pattern of entry and show that a large proportion of
investment is shared miles. When only owned miles are considered, entry
appears more moderate and industry concentration more typical of a high-
sunk-cost industry.
5The excluded regional networks are the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs)
and Alltel, Black Hills Fibercom, C3 Networks, Columbia Transcom, Connectiv, Dominion
Telecom, Dukenet, El Paso Global Networks, Electric Lightwave, Entergy, Florida Fiber
Network, FPL Fibernet, GPU Telecom, Iowa Network Services, ITC Deltacom, Kentucky
Data Link, Logix Communications, MP Telecom, NEON, Norlight, Onvoy, Palmetonet,
Progress Telecom, SON Communications, Telergy, Time Warner Telecom, and Valleynet.
Several of the firms that are included are essentially regional carriers that expanded to
national reach through IRUs. These are DTI, EPIK, Metromedia, Pathnet, and Touch
America.
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Table 1 shows total network route miles (owned plus shared) by firm for
the period 1990-2001. We include both “lit” and “dark” miles since the dark
miles would still be expected to exert competitive pressures in the long run.
During the early 1990s, three large long distance companies, AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint, had been joined by Williams, a natural gas pipeline company
that built a nationwide fiber optic network. Williams sold this network to
Worldcom in 1995.6
In 1997 – two years after the Netscape initial public offering launched
the Internet as a major commercial force and one year after passage of the
Telecommunications Act – growth in route miles increased rapidly. This
was a combination of expansion by existing networks and de novo entry. By
2001, there were 19 national networks, but profits were low and Pathnet had
exited the market, while EPIK contracted back to its Florida base. In 2002,
almost all of these firms were in bankruptcy.
EPIK’s sudden contraction from national to regional network demon-
strates that the distribution capacity of some of these companies did not
consist of sunk assets. Tables 2 and 3 show route miles actually owned by
each firm in each of the years and the percentage of total route miles that
6The FCC’s Worldcom data appears to include regional networks. We use only national
route miles reported by Worldcom (and its predecessor LDDS) in SEC filings.
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were owned.
At the beginning of the 1990s, all networks were owned outright by the
carriers. But entry in the later 90s involved so many swaps and IRUs that
many “national” carriers owned only a small percent of their rights of way,
and in a few cases owned none at all. The IRU strategy does not appear
to have been a temporary expedient to expand network reach, since most
carriers were decreasing their percentage owned even as they served more
route miles.
The bulk of total investment in network route miles came during 1998,
1999, and 2000. The majority of the new miles in this period were shared.
New right of way built in this period is mostly accounted for by upgrades
to the old AT&T and MCIWorldcom networks and the entry of three new
major networks, Qwest, Level 3, and Williams (see Figure 1). One way
to interpret this is that four incumbents were joined by three entrants and
fringe firms that were partially dependent on the seven major networks.
These data suggest that the industry did not experience overbuilding
and ruinous competition along the same lines as the railroads of the late
1800s. Rather, actual construction of new rights of way represented modest
entry, but the swaps of IRUs created a very competitive environment in
which prices fell.
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The Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) and the equivalent number of
equal-sized firms (calculated from the inverse of the HHI) for each year based
on total miles and owned miles appear in Table 4. Not all of the networks use
their capacity equally, but these measures based on route miles do provide
a guide to the potential long-run industry structure.
The difference between competition in terms of total miles and owned
miles is striking. Using total miles, the industry has moved from an oligopolis-
tic HHI to a very competitive one. But using owned miles, the industry
remains above the 1,000 limit for government scrutiny of mergers based on
the Department of Justice’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Still, there
were eight equivalent equal-sized firms using owned miles, which is a large
number of competitors by the standards of previous infrastructure develop-
ments such as railroads and early telephone.
We have now shown that shared miles made up a very substantial portion
of entry into the industry. Total miles grew so fast as to push concentra-
tion measures into an unsupportable region. But using owned miles, entry
was more measured and concentration remained in the oligopoly range. By
these measures, we conclude that while total miles may not have been vi-
able, owned miles were probably much closer to viability (if they had not
been shared out). Why would firms invest in miles that were not viable?
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One answer is that there was a race to capture a leading position in the
industry, and the investment was preemptive. In the next section, we test
this hypothesis.
5 Testing for Preemption
Some of the expansion in route miles was presumably due to the growth
of the Internet and the liberalization of the local access market under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. This still leaves open the question of
whether additional, “excessive” investment was part of preemptive behavior.
Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) (hereafter GL) develop an econometric
model to test for preemption, i.e. entry or growth deterrence and a race to
appropriate a profitable opportunity. GL collect data on 24 chemical prod-
ucts produced by 3 to 20 firms, circa 1960 through 1982. The independent
variable is binary: yi,j,t = 1 if firm i increased its capacity to produce prod-
uct j in year t by more than 5%. The 5% threshold is arbitrary, but they
claim that using other thresholds does not affect the results. The reason to
use a binary variable is to avoid scaling problems since small firms have huge
percent changes in their early years. All observations begin two years after
the firm enters the industry, so the startup capacity investment is excluded.
GL’s independent variables are constructed from firm i’s production ca-
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pacity and the total industry output. They are: capacity utilization (aver-
aged over two years), growth rate of output (averaged over four years), the
firm’s share of total capacity, the change in the firm’s capacity share (over
a two year period), and a “bandwagon effect” that measures the percent
increase in all rivals’ capacity. Because they expect that large and small
firms may behave differently, they interact all the variables with the firm’s
capacity share.
They argue that the coefficients on these variables provide a test for pre-
emption. If the market model is one of preemption, then investment will
not be affected by capacity share since other, strategic considerations will
drive firm behavior. A negative response to bandwagon investment indicates
successful preemption by other firms. Also, preemption requires that invest-
ment respond positively to capacity utilization because preemption implies
an effort to keep capacity low relative to revenue.
Suppose that instead of preemption, the market is growing in a sym-
metric fashion. The probability of a firm investing aggressively may not
be affected by capacity utilization, but it responds negatively to changes in
capacity share since firms will roughly maintain their market shares. Invest-
ment should respond positively to bandwagon investment by others since
firms have to keep up with one another in order to maintain their positions
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in the industry.
GL’s estimates show small firms, below 9% market share, using preemp-
tive strategies while large firms seem to maintain market share. To bolster
this result, they estimate a restricted model with only the variables expected
to affect preemption. The preemption model if rejected on the basis of a
likelihood ratio test in favor of the full model. Its estimates again suggest
that large firms can be preempted.
We apply this model to our data on the fiber optic industry. The com-
pany reports frequently give plans to put new route miles in service within
one year, so we convert all lags to one year. We face three main difficulties
in translating GL’s model, namely what constitutes capacity, output, and
capacity utilization.
For a measure of capacity we use route miles. As we have argued above,
all of the networks are similar in terms of coverage of the entire country, so
additional route miles imply a more dense, more robust network. The actual
production capacity of each link in the network is not important because
the advances in fiber optic technology essentially eliminated data throughput
constraints. Thus mileage, and the associated density of the network, is the





We cannot directly observe the output of these communications net-
works; such data are difficult to measure even for the owners of the networks
themselves and are not publicly available. Instead we proxy for industry out-
put with industry revenue. Revenues of the long distance networks them-
selves are the seemingly logical focus of interest, but there are two problems
with using them. First, many of the firms, such as AT&T, derive most
of their revenue from lines of business not directly related to their long-
haul networks. The firms do not report sufficiently disaggregated revenue
to correct for this problem. Second, the networks’ revenue is determined
endogenously with investment in route miles, so proper estimation would
require good instruments. As an alternative, we use total revenue of the
U.S. telecoms industry. Since these data include various local telephone,
wireless telephone, and business services, they should remove much of the
endogeneity problem and provide an index for opportunities to build addi-
tional route miles. The source for these data is the International Telecom-
munications Union Yearbook of Statistics, 2003 and 2000 editions. Yearly
revenue (REVt) and growth in revenue (GROWt = (REVt/REVt−1) − 1)
are reported in Table 5.7 Revenue is measured in 1995 dollars using the
consumer price index.
7An alternative growth measure, Internet traffic growth, proved to be highly collinear.
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Finally, we need a measure of capacity utilization. The same problems
with output data occur here too, so we compare growth in revenue to growth
in capacity. We calculate a Revenue per Mile Index for both total and owned
miles, RMITt and RMI
O
t , by comparing revenue per mile in year t with
revenue per mile in 1990. Thus, if firm i’s total and owned miles in year t













In 1990 there appear to have been modest opportunities to expand route
miles since there was a gradual increase in miles in the succeeding years.
Relative to this base level, RMI > 1 indicates relatively better opportunities
while RMI < 1 indicates relatively poorer ones.
An interesting feature of these data is that in 1995-97, there were ar-
guably opportunities to add route mileage (based on revenue), particularly
when looking at owned miles only. By the end of the sample period, revenue
per mile has fallen sharply. Owned miles show much less of this trend than
total miles due to the extensive use of shared mileage.
Given these interpretations of capacity, output, and capacity utilization,
we can construct the rest of GL’s independent variables as follows. Firm i’s
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The “bandwagon effect” that measures investment by firm i’s competitors









Note that the bandwagon variable is different from DELSHARE because
it concerns investment in the current year and it does not account for a
firm’s own investment. The correlation between BAND and DELSHARE is
R = 0.10 for total miles and R = 0.14 for owned miles.
Because small firms may differ from large firms, all variables are inter-
acted with SHARE. Since investment decisions must be taken prior to their
realizations, all variables are lagged one year except for BAND.
The dependent variable is binary and measures whether route miles were
increased substantially in a given year. For some threshold change d, define
Y ji,t = 1 if
M ji,t −M ji,t−1
M ji,t−1
> d
and 0 otherwise. The reason to use the binary variable is that smaller
firms have huge percentage additions in some years, which introduces scaling
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problems. We want to choose d to represent firms that made significant
investments over and above the general trend in the industry. We remove the
first year for new entrants from the sample. Then we observe the median and
40th, 60th, and 70th percentile growth in route miles across all observations
(see Table 6). We run several regressions, defining the dependent variable
using d equal to each of these percentile values.
The results of probit analysis using total miles are reported in Table
7. The different cutoff levels d seem to affect significance levels more than
magnitudes of the estimates. Changes in market share clearly do not affect
investment, which is characteristic of a preemptive environment. The band-
wagon effect is positive for small firms but negative for larger ones (though
only significant for the median case). This suggests that small firms may
have been preempting large ones. For the median case (d = 7.3%), the
boundary between “large” and “small” firms is 10.8% market share, roughly
the size of the four major incumbents.
Following GL, we also ran regressions omitting the variables SHARE
and DELSHARE since they are not expected to matter under preemption.
The signs of the estimates do not change on the remaining variables. Like-
lihood ratio tests accept the preemption model for the 40th, 50th, and 60th
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percentile cases, and reject for the 70th percentile case.8 This suggests that
preemptive behavior, at least by small firms, is a plausible explanation for
investment in total miles.
Table 8 reports results using owned miles only. The sample is slightly
smaller because in four cases firms entered the market with zero owned miles
in their first year. In many respects, the results are similar to total miles.
Again the coefficients on BAND suggest that larger firms may have been
preempted by smaller ones, with the boundary between firm sizes at about
13%. However, the DELSHARE variables are now significant also, which is
not expected in GL’s discussion of preemption.
The restricted preemption model fits more poorly for owned miles than
for total miles. For all but the 70th percentile case, it is rejected by likeli-
hood ratio rest.9 No doubt this is because of the greater importance of the
DELSHARE variables. Thus, the evidence for preemption is much more
limited and more mixed than in the total miles case. We interpret this to
mean that investment behavior with regard to owned miles is less well ex-
plained by the GL model and probably reflects a variety of strategies by
different firms.
8p-values of 46%, 81%, 37% and 4% respectively.
9p-values of 0.3%, 0.6%, 1.1%, and 25.9% respectively.
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6 Conclusion
We have examined the number of fiber-optic route miles built by U.S. tele-
com firms from 1990-2001. By sorting through each firm’s SEC reports and
press releases, we have been able to discover which routes are based on sunk
investments in right of way and conduit and which are based on relatively
non-sunk investment in IRUs. We find that more than half of total route
miles added during this period were based on non-sunk forms of investment.
We conclude that the loss-producing level of competition that has prevailed
since 2001 is due more to the willingness of firms to sell IRUs than to actual
over-investment like that which occurred in the nineteenth century railroad
boom.
We calculated a Revenue per Mile Index based on industry-wide changes
in revenue per route mile from a 1990 base. This measure suggests that there
were opportunities for increased investment in route miles in the mid 1990s,
but that investment after that proceeded much faster than revenue growth.
Using Gilbert and Lieberman’s (1987) model of oligopoly investment, we find
some evidence for preemptive behavior regarding total miles, which could
lead to excessive entry from an ex post perspective. Applying the same
analysis to owned miles produces less evidence of preemption. Large firms
may have been deterred from adding owned route miles due to the entry
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of smaller firms, but firms also seem to have been responding to changes in
market share.
Our general conclusion is that the only “excessive” element of national
fiber optic network investment was the very extensive sharing of route miles
between firms. Some of this sharing may have involved preemptive behavior,
and it led to remarkably low concentration for an industry with such high
fixed, sunk costs. Not including this sharing, the underlying investment in
owned route miles was more moderate, led to fairly reasonable concentration,
and does not appear to have been preemptive.
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Figures and Tables
360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 1,181 7,971 11,976 14,176
AT&T 32,398 32,500 33,500 35,000 36,022 37,419 38,704 38,704 39,576 39,576 42,551 46,500
Broadwing (IXC) 914 914 914 1,257 1,357 1,365 2,025 5,500 9,300 15,700 18,500 18,500
DTI 927 1,500 7,250 14,360 17,835
Dynegy 16,000
ENRON 3,400 16,281 16,281 16,281
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 3,801 11,500 1,244
Genuity (GTE) 5,283 12,000 17,500 17,500 20,800
Global Crossing (Frontier) 4,932 9,620 13,000 20,000 20,000
Level 3 410 9,084 15,236 15,639
MCI 16,000 16,700 17,040 19,793 21,460 21,049 23,096 25,234
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 332 332 332 332 519 519 621 866 5,052 8,036 16,600 26,000
Metromedia 3,099 18,000 18,000 18,000
Pathnet 478 1,500
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 1,210 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,408 1,408 3,977 7,101 15,000 25,500 25,500 23,700
Sprint (limited data) 22,093 22,725 22,799 22,996 22,996 22,996 23,432 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574
Touch America (Montana Power) 2,770 9,770 10,466 17,370 21,370
Velocita (PF.net) 4,000
Williams 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 0 0 0 9,300 17,000 20,800 28,700
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 1,300 11,000 12,589 19,619 47,529 47,806 47,806 47,806
XO (NEXTLINK) 16,000 16,000
Total 82,647 84,277 85,691 90,484 94,762 95,756 104,444 134,510 190,311 281,023 355,054 396,125
% change 2.0% 1.7% 5.6% 4.7% 1.0% 9.1% 28.8% 41.5% 47.7% 26.3% 11.6%
1998 1999 2000 20011990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Table 1: Total Route Miles, 1990-2001
360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 1,181 3,709 5,309 6,764
AT&T 32,398 32,500 33,500 35,000 36,022 37,419 38,704 38,704 39,576 39,576 41,064 44,009
Broadwing (IXC) 914 914 914 1,257 1,357 1,365 2,025 4,647 6,028 11,186 12,666 12,666
DTI 927 1,500 1,900 4,650 4,900
Dynegy 0
ENRON 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 790 894 1,244
Genuity (GTE) 0 0 2,753 2,753 6,053
Global Crossing (Frontier) 0 0 0 0 0
Level 3 410 9,022 15,174 15,577
MCI 16,000 16,700 17,040 16,793 18,207 17,858 19,595 25,234
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 332 332 332 332 519 519 621 866 5,052 8,036 9,475 9,740
Metromedia 0 255 255 255
Pathnet 239 980
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 1,210 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,408 1,408 3,977 7,101 14,467 16,322 16,322 14,522
Sprint (limited data) 22,093 22,725 22,799 22,996 22,996 22,996 23,432 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574
Touch America (Montana Power) 137 3,263 3,308 7,820 8,147
Velocita (PF.net) 1,462
Williams 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 0 0 0 1,830 10,101 14,812 17,800
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 1,300 11,000 12,589 13,878 41,788 42,065 42,065 42,065
XO (NEXTLINK) 0 0
Total 82,647 84,277 85,691 87,484 91,509 92,565 100,943 115,068 140,409 174,575 199,551 210,516
% change 2.0% 1.7% 2.1% 4.6% 1.2% 9.1% 14.0% 22.0% 24.3% 14.3% 5.5%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Table 2: Owned Route Miles, 1990-2001
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360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 100% 47% 44% 48%
AT&T 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 95%
Broadwing (IXC) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 84% 65% 71% 68% 68%
DTI 100% 100% 26% 32% 27%
Dynegy 0%
ENRON 51% 11% 11% 11%
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 21% 8% 100%
Genuity (GTE) 0% 0% 16% 16% 29%
Global Crossing (Frontier) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Level 3 100% 99% 100% 100%
MCI 100% 100% 100% 85% 85% 85% 85% 100%
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 57% 37%
Metromedia 0% 1% 1% 1%
Pathnet 50% 65%
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 64% 64% 61%
Sprint (limited data) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Touch America (Montana Power) 5% 33% 32% 45% 38%
Velocita (PF.net) 37%
Williams 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 20% 59% 71% 62%
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 100% 100% 100% 71% 88% 88% 88% 88%
XO (NEXTLINK) 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 97% 86% 74% 62% 56% 53%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001












1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Added through sharing
Added and owned by others
Added and owned by AT&T, MCI/Worldcom,
Sprint, Qwest, Level 3, Williams
Figure 1: Yearly Additions to Total Route Miles, 1990-2001
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Equal-Sized Equal-Sized
HHI HHI Firms Firms
Year Total Miles Owned Miles Total Miles Owned Miles
1990 2,767         2,767         3.6             3.6             
1991 2,743         2,743         3.6             3.6             
1992 2,764         2,764         3.6             3.6             
1993 2,740         2,788         3.6             3.6             
1994 2,658         2,696         3.8             3.7             
1995 2,723         2,770         3.7             3.6             
1996 2,529         2,561         4.0             3.9             
1997 1,778         2,233         5.6             4.5             
1998 1,425         2,110         7.0             4.7             
1999 892            1,500         11.2            6.7             
2000 708            1,281         14.1            7.8             
2001 674            1,234         14.8            8.1             
Table 4: HHIs and Equivalent Number of Firms, 1990-2001
Year REV GROW RMIT RMIO
1990 155.8 -2.4% 1.00 1.00
1991 155.1 -0.5% 0.98 0.98
1992 159.8 3.0% 0.99 0.99
1993 163.2 2.1% 0.96 0.99
1994 170.1 4.3% 0.95 0.99
1995 175.0 2.9% 0.97 1.00
1996 205.8 17.6% 1.05 1.08
1997 220.0 6.9% 0.87 1.01
1998 229.9 4.5% 0.64 0.87
1999 246.8 7.3% 0.47 0.75
2000 259.3 5.1% 0.39 0.69
2001 261.2 0.7% 0.35 0.66
Table 5: Revenue and Revenue per Mile Index, 1990-2001
(Revenue in billions of 1995 dollars)
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Table 6: Percent Change in Total and Owned Miles
(Not including first year for new entrants)
Variable d = 2.0% d = 7.3% d = 18.6% d = 48.9%
SHARETt−1 -19.5 -2.7 -38.1 -81.1**
0.16 0.86 0.34 0.05
RMITt−1 -0.4 1.5 -0.5 -2.8
0.72 0.28 0.81 0.16
RMITt−1 × SHARETt−1 24.4* -0.4 42.2 81.9**
0.07 0.98 0.25 0.04
GROWt−1 18.3 25.1* 33.8** 7.5
0.15 0.10 0.05 0.31
GROWt−1 × SHARETt−1 -98.6 -40.3 -157.4 -51.5
0.13 0.63 0.22 0.60
DELSHARETt−1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2
0.99 0.68 0.64 0.55
DELSHARETt−1 × SHARETt−1 1.1 2.3 -6.9 -2.8
0.72 0.44 0.56 0.66
BANDTt 4.0** 5.0** 5.2** 5.0**
0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02
BANDTt × SHARETt−1 -14.0 -46.3** -22.7 -10.4
0.21 0.05 0.57 0.78
constant -0.5 -2.2 -1.0 1.4
0.70 0.16 0.67 0.48
N 101 101 101 101
Log Likelihood -51.3 -45.6 -32.2 -31.5
Table 7: Probit Analysis of Expansion in Total Miles
p-values below estimates.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
* Significant at 0.10 level.
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Variable d = 0.7% d = 3.3% d = 9.2% d = 24.7%
SHAREOt−1 17.1 22.2 14.4 44.1
0.26 0.16 0.42 0.11
RMIOt−1 2.1 3.2 4.0* 7.3**
0.29 0.11 0.06 0.01
RMIOt−1 × SHAREOt−1 2.3 -14.6 -31.4* -50.7*
0.87 0.32 0.09 0.08
GROWt−1 18.4 16.5 22.2 36.1**
0.14 0.20 0.12 0.03
GROWt−1 × SHAREOt−1 -91.0 -36.5 -15.0 -133.4
0.14 0.56 0.86 0.26
DELSHAREOt−1 3.3** 2.2** -0.5** -0.1
0.01 0.04 0.02 0.20
DELSHAREOt−1 × SHAREOt−1 -12.4* -5.0 14.8** 2.3
0.06 0.47 0.05 0.25
BANDOt 6.3** 7.8** 8.8** 9.8**
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
BANDOt × SHAREOt−1 -31.8** -54.0** -96.8** -76.6
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.16
constant -6.4** -6.3** -4.3** -8.6**
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00
N 97 97 97 97
Log Likelihood -44.8 -44.2 -38.8 -31.2
Table 8: Probit Analysis of Expansion in Owned Miles
p-values below estimates.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
* Significant at 0.10 level.
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